Introduction
Firm exits, through bankruptcy or acquisition, are extreme outcomes in the continuous process of corporate restructuring. Exits are held to be cyclical in nature, with bankruptcies associated with economic downturns and acquisitions with recoveries. However, neither the impact of macroeconomic instability on the propensity to exit, nor the way in which bankruptcy and acquisition interrelate as competing hazards to the survival of the¯rm, has received much attention in the literature. Analysis at the¯rm level has tended to focus either on bankruptcy or on acquisition, and on the way exit is determined by the characteristics of the¯rm and its industry. Analysis of the in°uence of the macroeconomic environment has tended to focus on the impact of aggregate shocks on aggregate amounts of¯rm formation and dissolution.
We investigate the impact of macroeconomic conditions on¯rm failure and acquisition using a framework in which these are related processes and where changes in the macroeconomic environment may interact with relevant rm and industry features in amplifying or attenuating exit hazards. We investigate these two issues using data on all listed UK companies over an extended period -1965 to 2002 -spanning several business cycles. We use a competing-risks model to consider explicitly the joint determination of the probability of an operating¯rm being acquired and of it going bankrupt, where these mutually exclusive processes compete with each other to restrict the survival of the¯rm. Unlike discrete outcome models, hazard models explicitly incorporate the timing of alternative outcomes; this is important when the objective is to identify the in°uence of macroeconomic conditions on business failure. We use a rich set of¯rm level covariates along with industry and macro variables that might a®ect the likelihood of the¯rm being acquired, or going bankrupt.
The next section reviews the literature. Section 3 presents an economic framework for the joint determination of bankruptcy and acquisition decisions. The data are described in Section 4. Section 5 discusses hazard regression models of bankruptcy and acquisition in a competing risks framework. Section 6 presents the results of the estimated hazard regression models. Our conclusions are in Section 7. The extant literature on¯rm exit is reviewed in Siegfried and Evans (1994) and Caves (1998) . The role of¯rm speci¯c factors, age and size in particular, in determining¯rm failure are central in theoretical models of the¯rm life-cycle, including passive learning (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992) and active learning (Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Pakes and Ericson, 1998) formulations. Exit rates are predicted to decline with¯rm age, due to¯rm-level learning. In the credit scoring literature,¯nancial ratios including leverage, cash°ow, and pro¯tability, join¯rm age, size and industry as determinants of failure, with binary response models providing the basis for probability scores of company failure (Ta²er, 1982; Cuthbertson and Hudson, 1996; Lennox, 1999) .
Several studies have noted that¯rm entry and exit rates are highly correlated, though the nature of the relationship between the two di®er across industries, as well as over the ascending and descending stages of the business cycle. Empirical macro-studies that relate the macroeconomic environment to business performance in the UK note that movements in the aggregate failure rate of business establishments coincide with changes in macroeconomic performance (Hudson, 1986 ; Department of Trade and Industry, 1989; Robson, 1996) . Exit rates rise during the downturn and both growth rates and exits vary with size and¯nancial stability (\life cycle hypothesis"), as well as nominal and real shocks.
The economic cycle (characterised by macroeconomic variables such as interest rate, unemployment rate and retail sales growth rate) a®ect profitability (Geroski and Machin, 1993; Machin and Van-Reenen, 1993 ; Geroski et al., 1997) and gearing, and thereby in°uence company failures (Everett and Watson, 1998) . There is evidence for di®erential impact of changes in the macroeconomic environment on di®erent segments of the cross-section of quoted companies (Higson et al., , 2003 . In an examination of the e®ect of changes in interest rates on insolvency, Young (1995) found companies vulnerable to unanticipated changes in real interest rates. Caves (1998) reviewing the sizeable literature on¯rm exit, concludes: \... these studies ... control for macroeconomic conditions in various ways and degrees, but they leave the impression that ... hazard rates are rather insensitive to the observed variation in the macro environment" (p.1958). A notable exception is Goudie and Meeks (1991) who simulate¯nancial statements of UK¯rms, contingent on macroeconomic developments, and observe signi¯cant asymmetric and non-linear impact of the exchange rate upon failure rates. Through retrospective analysis of macro shocks they argue that for a signi¯cant minority among the major failed corporations, the shock determined their collapse.
Theoretical work on acquisition has emphasised choices made by¯rms between making acquisitions or becoming targets, depending on¯rm level features and the overall environment. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) focus on the role of Tobin's Q in acquisition investments of¯rms. In Shleifer and Vishny (2003) ¯rms make acquisitions or become targets, to bene¯t from temporary mis-valuation of stock prices.
The large body of empirical work on acquisitions is mainly based on aggregates, and fall into two branches. The¯rst aims at understanding time series patterns in aggregate acquisition activity, and¯nd evidence of acquisition waves and stochastic trends. The second, the acquisition-macro branch, seeks explanation of acquisition wave patterns in terms of economy wide macroeconomic and¯nancial variables that display similar cyclical patterns. Evidence suggests that acquisition activity is positively related to aggregate share price levels (recently, Benzing, 1991 Benzing, , 1993 Clarke and Ioannidis, 1996) . For other economy-wide measures, di®erent periods and data sets present con°icting results.
Though bankruptcy and acquisition have each generated large literatures, there has been relatively little analysis of these processes within a uni¯ed framework. Peel and Wilson (1989) argued that the acquisition of a distressed¯rm should be modelled as a distinct alternative to corporate failure. Schary (1991) provided a theoretical basis for considering acquisitions and bankruptcies as alternative routes to exit, pointing out that while bankruptcies and acquisitions are both forms of exit, they will have di®erent economic causes: while failing¯rms may avoid bankruptcy by being acquired, there are other economic motives and modalities for acquisitions. Models that address issues that are closest to our interests include Cooley and Quadrini (2006) who present a general equilibrium model of¯rm reactions to¯nancial drivers, and show how¯nancial factors a®ect¯rm survival through the internal¯-nance channel. Delli Gatti et al. (2003) develop a theoretical model linking the macroeconomic environment,¯nancial fragility and the entry and exit of¯rms. Corres and Ioannides (1996) allows for three kinds of exits -bankruptcy, endogenous exits when the current value of expected pro¯t stream falls below a threshold (voluntary liquidation), and exogenous exits caused by macroeconomic shocks.
The empirical study closest to ours is Wheelock and Wilson (2000) who identify characteristics that make individual US banks more likely to fail or be acquired. They use bank-speci¯c information to estimate competing-risks hazard regression models for failure and acquisition. Recent empirical work on UK industry by Disney et al. (2003) examines the UK establishment (ARD) database for the period 1986-1991 and estimate a hazard models of new¯rm survival. About two-thirds of new entrants are observed to exit within¯ve years; approximately half these were takeovers by other companies under the same ownership groups. They note that exit and entry rates correlate strongly, both across time and within industries. Exit rates decline with age indicating the importance of learning.
An Economic Framework of Competing Exit Risks
This section presents an economic framework for analysing the manner in which the competing risks of bankruptcy and acquisition are in°uenced by macroeconomic conditions, speci¯cally, macroeconomic instability. We use the terms macroeconomic instability and macroeconomic uncertainty interchangibly in this paper. Our formulation is in the spirit of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001, 2002 ). An important innovation in the theoretical model developed in this section lies in explicitly incorporating macroeconomic e®ects within a model of rm exits through bankruptcy and acquisitions. The existing theoretical and empirical literature has pointed out several ways in which¯rm performance, including exits, are related to changes in the macroeconomic environment (see, for example, Wadhwani, 1986; Cuthbertson and Hudson, 1996; Higson et al., 2002; and Delli Gatti et al., 2003) . These macroeconomic conditions can be characterised both by the aggregate level of economic activity (broadly speaking, economic expansions and downturn) as well as the degree of instability in the macroeconomic environment.
While¯rm exits through compulsory liquidation increase during periods of severe downturn in the aggregate economy (see, for example, Caballero and Hammour, 1994) , merger waves are broadly procyclical (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) . On the other hand, instability potentially a®ects¯rm exits in two ways. First, lenders are less willing to lend when there is higher instability (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990); this channel increases credit constraints on rms and leads some¯rms to bankruptcy. Second, uncertainty can induce growing¯rms to delay their decisions to invest in acquired capital (Dixit, 1989; Lambrecht and Myers, 2007) .
Further, the e®ect of uncertainty on business performance may be asymmetric, particularly in the presence of credit constraints (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) . This asymmetry has important implications for the way instability is measured, and is discussed later in the paper. Our economic model, which takes explicit account of the above macroeconomic e®ects on¯rm exits, is described below.
At any time, , each¯rm, , is at some risk of exit through bankruptcy or by being acquired. Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the way macroeconomic conditions a®ect exit risks. On one side are¯rms that exit due to¯nancial distress (through bankruptcy or through being acquired), or choose to exit even though they are not distressed. Adverse macroeconomic conditions increase the pool of¯rms in¯nancial distress. On the other side are investor¯rms who are in the market for acquisitions. Any¯rm that is not distressed will be characterised by some optimal level of investment   , conditional on the level and stability of the macroeconomy. This optimal investment, which maximises the expected present value of the¯rms' future cash°ows, will comprise both investment in new capital,  and acquired capital,  . The balance between  and  will depend on the relative prices of acquired and new capital, as well as on the¯xed and adjustment cost of acquisitions.
Let the -th¯rm's state of technology (or e±ciency) at time  be denoted by   and its capital by   . Firms operate under an AK type production function 2 which takes the form  (). Here  () is akin to the outputcapital ratio and depends on¯rm e±ciency:  ()  0. We assume that the dynamics in  and the economy wide macro-environment variable of interest,  (denoting instability) are each governed by Markov transition processes.  and  are each assumed to be positively autocorrelated, and independent of each other. Hence,  and  are jointly Markov, i.e.,
, where  and  are the (per unit capital) investments in new and acquired capital respectively ( =  + ), ( ) is the (per unit capital) adjustment cost of investment, and () is the¯rm speci¯c impact of macro-environment on pro¯ts. () is increasing and convex in , and (0) = 0. The price of new capital is normalised to unity, and  denotes the price of acquired capital (  1). Then, the market value of the¯rm per unit of capital under the optimal investment plan is:
is the expected present value of capital in the next period given the¯rm's  and the economy's  today, and  is the rate of depreciation. Since  and  are independent and positively autocorrelated, ( ) is increasing in  and decreasing in . Denote by   () the level of  at which the¯rm is indi®erent between exiting and staying in business, given macroeconomic conditions, and by  ¤ () the level of technology at which the¯rm is indi®erent between staying out of the acquisitions market or entering it.
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In a period of economic stability, when demand is more predictable, the incidence of¯nancial distress will be lower. The smaller pool of distressed rms may also face a larger number of potential acquirers whose investment policies are encouraged by macroeconomic stability. Thus¯rms that are on the verge of bankruptcy will have a higher probability of being rescued, and the observed bankruptcy rates can be expected to be lower. Further, in such periods the hazard of acquisitions will be higher, even though there are fewer distressed¯rms that are candidates for acquisition. With the boost to investment in more stable periods, the market for acquisitions may tighten, driving up the market price of acquired assets. This can be expected to induce a larger number of non-distressed¯rms to enter the pool of potential acquirees. These would be¯rms who¯nd the o®ers from potential acquirers to be higher than their own continuation values (Jovanovic and Rosseau, 2001) .
The implications of changes in  for¯rm exits and acquisitions can be understood with reference to a plot of the four regions of , (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002) Figure  2 ). In a period with higher , a larger number of¯rms decide to exit, and fewer¯rms decide to acquire. Hence, a larger number of¯rms are likely to go bankrupt during such periods.
Overall, in a period of economic stability, the propensity for bankruptcy will be lower, and the propensity for acquisitions will be higher. A testable implication of the model is that the impacts of macroeconomic instability on the likelihood of bankruptcy and acquisition are of opposite signs.
Data
The evaluation of the impact of macroeconomic°uctuations on business exits requires data running over several business cycles. We use a database of¯rm quoted in the UK, constructed by combining the Cambridge-DTI, DATASTREAM and EXSTAT databases of¯rm accounts. The combined rm level accounting data provides an unbalanced panel of about 4,100 UK listed companies over the period 1965 to 2002. There were 206 instances of bankruptcy and 1858 acquisitions among 48,046¯rm years over the 38 year period. 4 In terms of hazard model analysis, the data are right-censored and left-truncated.
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We use the term`bankruptcy' to denote the event of compulsory liquidation. We use the term`acquisition' to denote the event of business combination, which may take the form of a merger, an acquisition or a takeover. Interchangeable use of these words is standard in this literature. 6 
Measures of macroeconomic conditions
We use the following empirical proxies for macroeconomic conditions:
² As a measure of the business cycle (  ), we use a quarterly HodrickPrescott-¯ltered 7 series of UK output per capita ( = 100).
Given the strong trading linkages of the UK industrial sector with the global economy, and particularly with the US economy, it is likely that the global economic environment will a®ect the exit decisions and outcomes for UK¯rms.
² We allow for the possible impact of the global economy by including a similar measure of the US business cycle.
² Real interest rates are measured as the yield on 20-year sovereign bonds, less the annual rate of in°ation.
than declaration of bankruptcy. We assign accounting data for each company¯scal year to the calendar year that covers the majority of the accounting year corresponding to thē scal year. 5 The data used pertain to years, since 1965, during which each company is listed in the London Stock Exchange. Hence, for each company, the available data are left-truncated, and do not pertain to the entire period that it is listed.
6 It is somewhat rare for a business combination to be a`merger of equals'. These are, in practice, e®ectively unobservable to the extent that even case-based contextual research struggles to identify them.`Merger of equals' is not proxied by other apparently related constructs sometimes used in the literature, such as`friendly/hostile' or equity/cash consideration' { nor is it proxied by the use of pooling (merger) rather than purchase accounting for the transaction.
In our data,¯rm B was considered to have exited the industry if it was acquired by¯rm A. If, at the same time,¯rm A changed its name to C, we treated A as remaining in in the industry.
² The average annual real e®ective exchange rate is used to measure the exchange rate environment. Goudie and Meeks (1991) have found that a stronger pound sterling raises the propensity of¯rms to go bankrupt.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the annual incidence of bankruptcies and of acquisitions, as well as the business cycle indicator for the year. Incidence is measured as the ratio of the number of companies that went bankrupt (and the number that were acquired) during the year, to the total number of listed companies. Quoted¯rm bankruptcies were particularly high during years when the economy turned down after a peak, and were lower during upturns in the business cycle. The growth rates in¯rm registration hint at a plausible mechanism for this; entries are pro-cyclical and it is possible that the larger number of entries during the upturn of the business cycle force some¯rms out of business when the economy turns down. Figure 5 indicates that acquisitions were procyclical. Research on aggregate mergers and acquisitions activity has found aggregate market capitalisation to be a determinant of acquisition demand. Similarly, earlier research on¯rm exits have found explanatory power in other measures of aggregate economic activity. We experimented with several other measures, such as Tobin's q, industrial production, stance of monetary policy and capacity utilisation. and found the substantive conclusions of our estimated models to be robust to variable selection. Thus our¯nal choice of macroeconomic variables has been guided by availability of consistent data over the 38-year period, as well as by statistical variable selection methods.
Measures of macroeconomic stability
Figures 3 and 4 also suggest that even for mature (quoted)¯rms, the incidence of bankruptcy and acquisition vary substantially over time. While a part of the aggregate movement may be explained by the business cycle, macroeconomic stability may also have a role to play. It has been argued that the impact of uncertainty on business performance is essentially asymmetric. For example, in economies with credit constraints, credit imperfections generate a transmission mechanism through which a small, temporary shock can generate large, persistent domestic balance sheet e®ects. This feature has motivated¯nancial accelerator-type models (Bernanke et al., 1996) , including the borrowing constraint in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , costly state veri¯cation in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and sudden stops in Calvo (2000) . The ampli¯cation e®ect can explain why a small fundamental problem can evolve into a large-scale deterioration of economic performance. The credit constraint, interacting with aggregate economic activity over the business cycle can generates asymmetric e®ects in response to unexpected productivity shocks. 8 There is related empirical work on mechanisms which create asymmetric volatility responses (Engle and Ng, 1993) .
Traditional measures of instability, for example those based on standard deviations, are not able to capture these asymmetric e®ects. We use signed gradients in monthly measures of macroeconomic indicators to identify sharp variations. We use the following measures of macroeconomic instability:
² To measure exchange rate instability we use year-on-year variations in the exchange rate.
² Price instability is measured by the largest month-to-month rate of variation of the retail price index within the calendar year.
² Instability in long term interest rate is measured by the largest monthto-month rate of variation within the calendar year, of yield rates on 20-year sovereign bonds.
Firm-level and industry-level characteristics
We include a number of variables characterising the¯rm and its¯nancial performance, and controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the industry level.
² Firm size is measured as the logarithm of¯xed capital in real terms, incremented by unity.
² Pro¯tability is measured by the ratio of cash°ow to one-year-lagged total assets. ² We use current ratio, the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, as a measure of liquidity.
² Debt sustainability is measured using interest cover, the ratio of interest expenses to pro¯ts before interest and tax.
² We measure the¯rm's¯nancial structure in terms of its gearing ratio, which is the ratio of debt to the sum of debt and equity.
We experimented extensively with alternative¯rm-level measures, but the substantive conclusions from our models were robust to choice of variables. In addition to the usual ratios, we estimated our model using lagged average sales growth over the past 3 and 5 years, as a proxy for demand conditions. Again, conclusions were robust, though the sample sizes were substantially reduced.
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 1 . The sample characteristics display signi¯cant variability both across¯rms, and over the 38 year period.
Econometric Methodology
There are a few empirical studies on¯rm exits based on discrete outcome or scoring models such as probit or logit, 10 but the larger part of the literature have relied on hazard regression models for inference. In our context, there are two advantages to the use of hazard models.
First, these models explicitly incorporate the timing of alternative outcomes, and therefore adequately account for sample selection due to censoring. For example, the likelihood contribution for a¯rm that went bankrupt in 1980 would incorporate not only the information that the¯rm went bankrupt, and was not acquired in 1980; but also the fact that it neither went bankrupt nor was acquired in any of the previous years of its existence.
Second, hazard regression models can be used to explicitly segregate the age aspect of the propensity to survive (or exit) from the e®ect of other covariates. At the same time, this framework allows the e®ect of age on the hazard to be completely°exible, and the e®ect of other covariates to possibly vary with age of the¯rm. This is important in disentangling the in°uence of macroeconomic conditions on business exit from the in°uence of rm-speci¯c and industry factors, as well as for understanding the role of learning in mature¯rms.
The model places the risks of bankruptcy and acquisitions in a uni¯ed framework. Each¯rm is conceived as being concurrently under risk of bankruptcy and acquisition during each year of its life. In other words, bankruptcy and acquisitions are mutually exclusive outcomes, in°uenced by their own determinants, competing to restrict the survival of an operating¯rm.
In a hazard model framework, this data generating process can be parametrised using a competing risk model where inference is based on the causespeci¯c intensity (hazard) rates   (; ), de¯ned as:
where  = 1  are the  competing causes of failure, and   (0; ) = 0;  = 1 . The Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) model provides a convenient description of the regression relationship between the cause-speci¯c hazard rates (Equation 1) corresponding to the competing causes of failure, and various explanatory variables (covariates) describing the¯rm's endowments (  ), the macroeconomic environment (  ) and macroeconomic instability (  ), given the age of the¯rm (  ). The model postulates that the logarithm of the cause-speci¯c hazard function is a linear function of the covariates:
where  0 () is the baseline hazard function corresponding to the -th cause of failure (in the present case,  takes two values { bankruptcy or acquisition) at age   ,  is the vector of covariates (comprising   ,   and   ), and   are the vectors of coe±cients corresponding to the -th cause of failure.
The parameters of the model are (a) the two baseline hazard functions,  0 (), corresponding to the two competing causes of failure, and (b) the distinct vectors of covariate e®ects (  ) for the two causes. In the following subsections, we consider estimation in the simple case when proportionality holds, and explain some additional features of our estimation procedure. These include discussion of: Further checks on the robustness of our model estimates are discussed in the Appendix.
Estimation under PH assumption
The assumption of proportional hazards is often violated in application and sometimes contested by relevant theory. Respecting this, we allow covariate e®ects to vary with the age of the¯rm { This is a signi¯cant generalisation of the PH model. We begin our discussion with¯xed covariate e®ects, and extend to the estimation of age-varying regression parameters.
Estimation of a Cox PH model in a multivariate duration model setting is discussed in Wei et al. (1989) and Spiekerman and Lin (1998) ; their model is similar to our regression model for cause-speci¯c hazard rates (Equation 2). Inference is based on \quasi-partial likelihood" estimating equations with a working assumption of independence (Spiekerman and Lin, 1998 ). In our competing risks setting, this assumption stipulates that censoring by the competing risks must be independent of the age of the¯rm at exit, conditional on the observed covariates  11 . In essence, this requires the selection of covariates such that, after conditioning on them, the competing exit processes are independent of each other. We discuss this conditional independence assumption in more detail in the following subsection.
Following Spiekerman and Lin (1998), we express the log-\quasi-partial likelihood" of   , under the independence assumption, as:
where   () denotes the counting process for exits corresponding to the -th competing risk, and   () denotes the corresponding at-risk indicator function (see Andersen et al., 1993) . The above expression is the same as the partial likelihood for a strati¯ed Cox model with two independent strata and independent observations in each strata. Our estimates of covariate e®ects, b   , are the ones that maximise the above log-\quasi-partial likelihood" (Equation 3)
and the estimates of the baseline cumulative hazard functions
are the corresponding Aalen-Breslow type estimators:
There are several notable features of this estimation methodology. First, the quasi-partial likelihood (Equation 3) is valid under certain forms of unobserved heterogeneity. Speci¯cally, estimation based on this quasi-partial likelihood accounts for unobserved heterogeneity arising from a common scalar index of unobserved regressors for the two competing risks (Spiekerman and Lin, 1998) 12 .
Second, estimation of the model is straightforward. It can be seen from the form of the quasi-partial likelihood that estimating this model is equivalent to estimating two separate univariate Cox regression models corresponding to the two causes of failure { acquisitions and bankruptcies. Therefore, the model can be estimated by maximising the usual strati¯ed partial likelihood function (Cox, 1972) . In other words, the estimation of the competing risks model involves estimation of two separate Cox PH models, one for exits due to bankruptcy and the other one for acquisitions. In each case we treat exits due to the other cause as censored cases. However, unlike the univariate hazard regression model, the interpretation of our parameter estimates will relate to the cause-speci¯c hazard functions rather than the hazard functions themselves.
Third, the data allow us to observe the year a¯rm is listed and its year of exit. Since age is recorded only in years, the latent duration data are continuous, but observed durations are interval censored. Further, there is also considerable variation in the ages of the¯rms included in the sample. For example, the oldest exit due to bankruptcy is observed at an age of 113 years post-listing, while for acquisitions the oldest observed case is 186 years. Given the large range in age, we estimate the model in a continuous duration framework using Cox partial likelihood estimates of the regression models (Cox, 1972), thereby ignoring the interval censored nature of observed data. It is, therefore, necessary to specify a method for handling ties in the ages of¯rms at exit while computing the partial likelihood (see Kalb°eisch and Prentice, 2002) . We use the Peto-Breslow approximation (Breslow, 1974) to adjust for ties in computing the log quasi-partial likelihood and the martingale residuals.
Independence of exits due to competing causes
As in the case of univariate Cox regression models, the inference procedure presented above is valid only under the assumption that censoring is independent of exit conditional on covariates included in the model. In the competing risks model, exits are censored by competing causes of failure and hence we have to explicitly make this assumption. Such independence can be achieved by including all regressors in both the models 13 .
13 See also. Andersen et al. (1993) Consider, for example, the regression model for the cause-speci¯c hazard of exits due to bankruptcy. Under the competing risks data generating process, some exits due to bankruptcy will be censored by acquisitions. Likewise exits due to acquisitions are not unconditionally independent of bankruptcy exits. Therefore, in order to infer on exits due to bankruptcy, the process by which¯rms get censored (get excluded from the chance of going bankrupt by exit through acquisitions, or any other reason) must also be modelled along with the exit process. This requires that we include all covariates a®ecting the competing exit process (acquisitions) in the model for bankruptcy. We assume that conditional on the covariates, bankruptcy exits are independent of exits due to acquisitions, and vice versa 14 . Thus, when we consider the hazard regression model for bankruptcy, we include all the factors a®ecting acquisition hazard, and assume that other forms of censoring are either independent or at least depend on the same covariates. We deal in a similar way with the regression model for exit due to acquisitions.
Age-varying covariate e®ects
It is well known that the Cox PH model substantially restricts interdependence between the explanatory variables and duration. Proportional hazards imply that the coe±cients of the hazard function regressors are restricted to constancy over time { an assumption that is frequently violated in empirical application 15 . An appealing solution to such violation of proportionality is to allow the covariate to have di®erent e®ects on the hazard according to the age of the¯rm. Several estimators have been proposed in the literature that allow for such time-varying coe±cients in the Cox regression model. We use the histogram-sieve estimators of Murphy and Sen (1991), which are intuitive and permit practical and useful inference.
This method involves dividing the duration scale into several intervals, and including the continuous covariate interacted with indicator functions corresponding to each of the intervals as covariates in a modi¯ed Cox PH model. Since we expect a non-constant covariate e®ect, we would ideally like to have a large number of intervals to capture this feature. An alternative would be to use kernel based methods to estimate the covariate e®ect continuously over duration (see Bhattacharjee, 2004) . We divide the range in which the ages of¯rms fall into four intervals { the choice of the number of intervals and the cut-o® ages was determined by considerations of parsimony and the requirement that each interval should include su±cient number of exits (of each competing type) and a balanced number of¯rm-years (observations) 16 . Our chosen 4 intervals are age 0 ¡ 4 years, age 5 ¡ 15 years, age 16 ¡ 25 years and age  25 years, post-listing. Each of these four intervals have reasonable incidence from the total sample, covering 7569 (16 per cent), 13474 (28 per cent), 11817 (25 per cent) and 15234 (32 per cent) company years respectively 17 . Finding covariates that have non-proportional e®ects is an important step in the implementation of the above methodology. We use two statistical tests to¯nd covariates that may have age-varying e®ects on the cause-speci¯c hazard of either exit. The¯rst is a test for the proportionality assumption based on martingale residuals (Grambsch and Therneau, 1994) , and the second is a test that the e®ect of a given covariate does not vary with the age of thē rm (Bhattacharjee and Das, 2002) . Both tests lead to a very similar selection of covariates. Our empirical results demonstrate that several covariates have age-varying covariate e®ects, and segmentation of the duration scale in characterising e®ectively the way the impact of a covariate varies over the life of the¯rm, post-listing.
Left truncation and robustness of estimates
In addition to right-censoring (by dependant competing risks), our duration data are truncated to the left, in that they pertain only to the period after 1965. For a given¯rm, the age at left-truncation is given by  = 1965 ¡ , where  is the listing-year of the¯rm. The Cox partial likelihood estimates based on a modi¯ed de¯nition of risk sets (delayed entry) are valid if truncation and exits are independent either unconditionally, or at least after conditioning on the included covariates. While there is no simple way to test such conditional independence, the impact of dependence on estimates can be examined by stratifying the sample with respect to age at truncation. We evaluate the robustness of our results to dependent truncation by estimating the age at exit models conditioned on di®erent ranges of the age at left-truncation, and examining the sensitivity of model estimates. We also estimate the models for sub-samples of the data based on di®erent starting years. We truncate the sample at 1970 (instead of 1965), and estimate the models for bankruptcy and acquisitions for this sub-sample.
The Insolvency Act of 1986 is likely to have had a mitigating e®ect on corporate failures (Cuthbertson and Hudson, 1996; Liu, 2004) 18 . In order to examine whether this has a signi¯cant e®ect on our results, we also estimate the model for bankruptcy for the period from 1986 onwards.
In addition to evaluating left truncation, we check the robustness of our estimates in other ways. First, we estimate comparable logit models for exits due to bankruptcy and acquisition and compare the results with our hazard model estimates. Second, we compute jackknife estimates of the model to evaluate the robustness of our parameter estimates and their standard errors.
Results of these robustness tests and the check for impact of the Insolvency Act 1986 are presented in the Appendix. It is evident that our hazard regression models for bankruptcies and acquisitions are robust. We do¯nd evidence of e®ect of the Insolvency Act 1986, but the conclusions from our estimates for the period since 1965 are preserved. Bhattacharjee et al. (2003) have found similar evidence of the impact of Chapter 11 legislation on bankruptcies and acquisitions in the US.
Results
The maximum partial likelihood model estimates of the two models, for bankruptcies and for acquisitions, are reported in Table 2 . The reported estimates are hazard ratios, which are exponentials of the estimates of the Cox PH model regression coe±cients. These estimates are interpreted as the factor by which the hazard would be increased if there were a one unit increase in the covariate under consideration, other things equal. Hence, if the hazard ratio is unity the covariate has no e®ect, while if it is 2, a one unit rise in the covariate will double the hazard of exit.
The reported -scores are based on robust standard error estimates proposed by Lin and Wei (1989) . These are obtained using a sandwich estimator, where clustering by year is adjusted fro by summing the score residuals within each year before applying the sandwich estimator. The¯t of models is judged using a Wald chi-square test, and the validity of the proportionality assumption by the tests proposed in Grambsch and Therneau (1994) and Bhattacharjee and Das (2002) . These tests help us identify two regressors with age-varying covariate e®ects. The e®ect of these covariates (our measures of instability in exchange rates and in°ation) are allowed to vary over the age of the¯rm using the histogram sieve estimator (Murphy and Sen, 1991) . Our checks for sensitivity of the estimates indicates that the estimated models are quite robust (see Appendix).
Firm and industry speci¯c factors
Industry matters signi¯cantly for either form of exit. Textiles and construction companies are more likely to go bankrupt but less likely to be acquired. While¯rms in the paper/ packaging business are more likely to be acquired, rms in the engineering and ICT industries have a lower acquisition propensity. The broad division appears to fall along the traditional/modern divide.
Firm speci¯c characteristics have impacts suggested in the literature. The rates of bankruptcy and acquisition decline sharply with size in the higher size-ranges. Figure 5 shows the estimated hazard ratios against sizepercentiles after conditioning on other covariates. There is a sharp decline of bankruptcy hazard with size. The¯gure supports the stylised fact from the acquisition literature that quoted¯rms in the middle range of the sizedistribution are considerably more likely to be acquired. + { Signi¯cant at 1%, 5% and 10%level respectively. Firms with higher interest cover have a low exit hazard from both bankruptcy and acquisitions. While a higher gearing enhances the risk of bankruptcy, cash rich¯rms and¯rms with higher liquidity (with higher cash°ow to capital ratio and higher current ratio respectively) are preferred as acquisition targets.
Macroeconomic factors
We conditioned on the long term real interest rate and the sterling-dollar exchange rate. The long term rate has a signi¯cant impact only on acquisitions while the exchange rate has no signi¯cant impact on either bankruptcy or acquisition. We also conditioned on measures of both the UK and the US business cycle. Only the US business cycle measure has a signi¯cant e®ect on bankruptcies and acquisitions; apparently the US economy is a better predictor of UK bankruptcies and acquisitions than the business cycle in the UK itself. The e®ect of the US business cycle on acquisitions is particularly strong, possibly re°ecting the dominance of US acquirers in the international acquisition markets in the period. We interpret the strong role of the US business cycle as an indication of the importance of demand for acquired capital from the international capital market in driving merger waves. In the case of bankruptcy, the e®ect is likely to have been driven by demand for exports.
In comparison to general macroeconomic conditions, the impact of macroeconomic instability on business exits is more pronounced, and depends substantially on the age of the¯rm since listing, particularly for acquisitions 19 . Newly listed¯rms are more likely to go bankrupt during the years when exchange rate changes are very sharp. On the other hand, acquisition hazard for younger¯rms is reduced during these years.
Price instability 20 and volatility in long term interest rates subdued acquisition activity signi¯cantly. While the e®ect of instability on bankruptcy hazard is not signi¯cant for the entire period under analysis, the e®ect is more pronounced for the recent period after the introduction of the Insolvency Act of 1986 (Table 3A , Appendix). Overall, our¯ndings point to the detrimental impact of macroeconomic instability on survival. Figure 6 plots the baseline cumulative hazard functions of bankruptcy and acquisition against the age of the¯rm reckoned from listing date. Note that the hazard of mergers is about four times that of bankruptcy, controlling for covariates. While the baseline hazard due to mergers appears to be constant over the lifetime of a¯rm, post-listing, the baseline hazard due to bankruptcy decreases with age upto about 20 years post-listing, arguably re°ecting a learning e®ect. In the literature, evidence in favour of learning models has been advanced from cohort studies of new young¯rms, and it is interesting to note evidence for mature¯rms. Figures 2 and 4 also present the year-wise predicted incidence rates of bankruptcies and acquisitions against the observed incidence rates. The close conformity between the two is noteworthy.
Conclusions
Our objective was to examine the relationship between business exits and instability associated with the macroeconomic cycle, focussing on large and mature (listed) UK companies, over a long (thirty-four year) period. We disentangled the joint determination of probabilities of two mutually exclusive processes -¯rms being acquired and¯rms going bankrupt -by estimating a competing risks model for the probabilities of exit in either form, in terms of rm characteristics, industry and features of the business cycle. Our model explains the observed time variation in the incidence of bankruptcy and acquisitions quite well. The two types of exits are marked by di®erences in the e®ects of¯rm-level drivers, industry, macroeconomic conditions as well as macroeconomic instability.
At the¯rm level our¯ndings corroborate earlier results; the baseline hazard due to bankruptcy and mergers decreases with age after listing. Other factors remaining constant, larger¯rms and¯rms with higher interest cover are less likely to go bankrupt or be acquired. Firms with higher liquidity and cash rish¯rms are more attrative acquisition targets, and¯rms with higher gearing are more likely to go bankrupt.
To the best of our knowledge, our results on the impact of macroeconomic instability on exits are new. There are notable di®erences in the way in which recently listed¯rms, and those listed some years previously respond to changes in the macroeconomic environment. Uncertainty in the form of sharp increases in in°ation and sharp depreciation of the pound sterling affect freshly listed¯rms adversely -they are more likely to go bankrupt during unstable years. Acquisition activity is also subdued in these years. Further, there are less bankruptcies and more acquisitions during an economic upturn, particularly when measured by the US business cycle. The¯nding of contemporaneous increase in bankruptcies and decline in acquisitions, in a period of instability or low economic growth, suggests the need for further work on assessing causal relationships between the two processes.
The results reported here underscore the importance of smooth macroeconomic management for the corporate sector. In an era of globalisation they also point to the role that may potentially be played by business cycles in other economic regions in the determination of both forms of business exit. International comparisons, estimating similar models for other economies would aid understanding and policy. Estimates of a similar model for the US (Bhattacharjee et al., 2003 ) also points to an important role for bankruptcy legislation.
APPENDIX: Robustness of model estimates
We examine the robustness of our results by comparing estimates of di®er-ent models and estimates over di®erent samples of¯rms (¯rm-years). Specifically, we employ four di®erent tests. Parameters reported are hazard ratios (exponential of the regression coe±cient estimates). Volatility is measured as maximum monthly di®erence during the year, divided by the no. of intervening mths. ¤¤ , ¤ and + { Signi¯cant at 1%, 5% and 10%level respectively. First, we estimate our models for di®erent ranges of the age at left truncation. As noted earlier, the truncation duration  may be represented as  = 1965 ¡ , where  is the listing-year of the company 21 The truncation duration  range shows considerable variation over the cross-section of¯rms; the¯rst quartile (Q1), median (Q2) and third quartile (Q3) are 0, 1 and 17 years respectively. Since 1965 ¡  is known at the time of listing and is therefore deterministic, it is likely that  is independent of the age of the ¯rm at exit. On the other hand, if characteristics of the¯rms listed before 1965 are substantially di®erent from those listed more recently, we may have some dependence between age at left truncation and exit age. We conducted a formal test of independence (Tsai, 1990) of truncation duration  and the (right-censored) age at exit. This test rejects the independence hypothesis for exits due to bankruptcy at the 5 per cent level, but does not reject independence for acquisitions. Despite dependent left truncation, our model for exits due to bankruptcy would still be adequate if the two durations were independent after conditioning on covariates included in the bankruptcy model. We examine robustness by estimating separate hazard models for truncation durations upto the median and upto the third quartile of the cross-sectional distribution of . If the coe±cients are similar in signs and signi¯cance with our estimates for the full sample, we are safe in concluding that our model estimates are robust. The above estimates for truncation duration  · 17 years are presented, separately for bankruptcy and acquisitions, in Tables 3A  and 3B respectively.
Second, we truncate the sample at 1970 (instead of 1965), and estimate models for this sample. These estimates are included in Tables 3A and  3B . Our estimates for the full sample are robust to truncation duration, as indicated by their similarity to estimates for  · 17 years and for the period 1970-2002.
Third, we estimate logit models comparable with our estimated hazard models. There are some important di®erences between hazard models and binary response models such as the logit. Unlike the logit, hazard regression models explicitly incorporate the nature of censoring inherent in duration data, and are therefore more appropriate for our focus. Further, our hazard regression model incorporates an important role for the age of the¯rm in determining the hazard rate of exits, in terms of nonparametric patterns for the baseline hazard function and for age-varying covariate e®ects. The age e®ect needs to be incorporated explicitly into the logit model. To allow for comparability with hazard model estimates, we use age-dummies in logit models to allow for the e®ect of age to be°exible, as in our framework. Though not exactly comparable, the estimated logit models allowing for°exible e®ect of age since listing (presented in Tables 3A and 3B) return qualitatively similar results.
Fourth, we employ a jackknife procedure, by removing one company at a time from the sample and computing estimates based on all the other companies. Since di®erent companies return di®erent number of companyyears, removing di®erent companies would involve omitting di®erent number of observations from the sample. In this sense, this is not a proper jackknife 22 . The jackknife results for both the parameter estimates and their standard errors are robust across various jackknife replications.
The above sensitivity investigations provide convincing evidence of the robustness of our model estimates. 22 An exact jackknife procedure is di±cult to devise in our case because we have an unbalanced panel. The Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis was established by a direct grant from the University of St Andrews in 2003. The Centre funds PhD students and facilitates a programme of research centred on macroeconomic theory and policy. The Centre has research interests in areas such as: characterising the key stylised facts of the business cycle; constructing theoretical models that can match these business cycles; using theoretical models to understand the normative and positive aspects of the macroeconomic policymakers' stabilisation problem, in both open and closed economies; understanding the conduct of monetary/macroeconomic policy in the UK and other countries; analyzing the impact of globalization and policy reform on the macroeconomy; and analyzing the impact of financial factors on the long-run growth of the UK economy, from both an historical and a theoretical perspective. The Centre also has interests in developing numerical techniques for analyzing dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Its affiliated members are Faculty members at St Andrews and elsewhere with interests in the broad area of dynamic macroeconomics. Its international Advisory Board comprises a group of leading macroeconomists and, ex officio, the University's Principal. 
